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Machine learning is promising, but it often needs to process vast amounts of sensitive
data which raises concerns about privacy. In this white-paper, we introduce Substra,
a distributed framework for privacy-preserving, traceable and collaborative Machine
Learning. Substra gathers data providers and algorithm designers into a network of
nodes that can train models on demand but under advanced permission regimes. To
guarantee data privacy, Substra implements distributed learning: the data never leave
their nodes; only algorithms, predictive models and non-sensitive metadata are ex-
changed on the network. The computations are orchestrated by a Distributed Ledger
Technology which guarantees traceability and authenticity of information without need-
ing to trust a third party. Although originally developed for Healthcare applications,
Substra is not data, algorithm or programming language specific. It supports many
types of computation plans including parallel computation plan commonly used in Fed-
erated Learning. With appropriate guidelines, it can be deployed for numerous Machine
Learning use-cases with data or algorithm providers where trust is limited.
Context Substra is an open source framework which can be found on the Substra github
(https://github.com/SubstraFoundation). It was originally developped by Owkin (https://www.owkin.com/),
which proposes an enterprise version of Substra for Healthcare. It is now hosted by the nonprofit
Substra Foundation (https://www.substra.ai/).
1 Introduction
Machine Learning (ML) is a promising field with many applications; organizations of all sizes
are practising it, from individual researchers to the largest companies in the world. In doing so,
they concentrate an extremely large amount of data. Today, data business is flourishing. However,
these practices raise important ethical questions which ultimately could limit the potential social
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benefits of ML [14, 25]. ML requires large amounts of data to learn from examples efficiently
[18]. In ML more data often leads to better predictive performance. Usually, different sources,
such as users, patients, measuring devices etc, produce data in a decentralized way. This source
distribution makes it difficult to have enough data for training accurate models. Currently, the
standard methodology for ML is to gather data in a central database.
However, data is often sensitive. In the case of personal data, which are explicitly related to
an individual, privacy is at stake. Personal data are particulary useful and valuable in the modern
economy. With personal data it is possible to personalize services, which has brought much added
value to certain applications. This can involve significant risks if the data are not used in the
interest of the individual. Not only should personal data be secured from potential attackers, but
the organisations collecting data should also be transparent and aligned with user expectations.
In the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [3] has imposed consent
and control of citizens over their personal data as a fundamental right. Beyond privacy, data can
also be sensitive when it has economic value. Information is often confidential and data owners
want to control who accesses it. Examples range from classified information and industrial secrets
to strategic data which can give an edge in a competitive market. From the perspective of tooling,
privacy-preserving and confidentiality-preserving are very similar and differ mostly in the lack of
regulation covering the latter.
Thus, a tradeoff exists between predictive performance improvement versus data privacy and
confidentiality. ML always needs more data, but data tend to be increasingly more protected. The
centralization paradigm where a single actor gathers all data on its infrastructure is reaching its
limit.
A relevant way to solve this tradeoff lies in distributing computing and remote execution
of predictive tasks. In this approach, the data themselves never leave their nodes. In ML, this
includes Federated Learning: each dataset is stored on a node in a network, and only the
algorithms and predictive models are exchanged between them [22, 12]. This immediately raises
the question of the potential information leaks in a trained model. The research on ML security and
privacy has seen a significant increase in recent years covering topics from model inversion [16] and
membership attacks to model extraction [27]. A residual risk is that data controllers still have to
trust a central service that orchestrates federated learning, and distributes models and metadata
across the network. Research in Secured Multi Party Computation (SMPC) [17] has proposed
several schemes and tools to solve the problem and some have been recently proposed precisely
on the ML context of this whitepaper [20]. The results are promising, but a large computing and
communication overhead may slow the growth of this field.
Reliability and reproducibility of ML is also a major challenge to wide social and market
adoption. It is now clear that ML is relevant in many well defined industrial applications, but it
is restricted to standardized tasks and still needs to improve in the face of the inherent variability
of certain phenomena. For some sensitive applications, such as Healthcare, one can not tolerate
mistakes. In ML, predictive models are trained from a set of examples and, even with the best tech-
nology, models will perform poorly on a new example which may be significantly different from the
training dataset. Building representative datasets is key to creating robust models. Consequently,
it is fundamental to consider the training of predictive models together with sound evaluation. A
sound evaluation should always be performed on a representative test dataset of the target pop-
ulation of data. This evaluation should be entirely traceable and reproducible. Furthermore, in
sensitive situations, evaluation should be done by independent organisations. Today, there is a
lack of collaborative tools which could make the evaluation or certification processes regarding the
ML predictions more reliable.
Parallel to the growth of ML and its risk mitigations, the field of Distributed Ledger Tech-
nologies (DLT) has recently gained momentum with the rapid rise of blockchain technology from
early conception to deployment of mature technology; networks that are both broadly used and
indestructible. Services built on top of blockchains are said to be trustless: one does not need to
trust a third party to guarantee integrity and availability of the service. Today, a large number
of users contribute daily to the secure hosting of a distributed and unfalsifiable database, called a
ledger, on networks powered by protocols such as Bitcoin [23] or Ethereum [28]. Ledger networks
are often operated through smart-contracts which are simply traceable functions on the state of
the ledgher. This amounts to creating trustless services where one does not rely on a third party to
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provide a reliable service. In the wake of public blockchains, several private blockchain frameworks
have emerged, many of them are hosted by the Hyperledger initiative [5, 11]. The core difference
is that private blockchains are deployed within a restricted group of users. This significantly sim-
plifies the underlying consensus mechanism and, in particular, removes the requirement of large
computing power associated with the Proof of Work consensus mechanism, as is required by the
Bitcoin network.
In this whitepaper, we describe Substra, a traceable and privacy-preserving framework
for collaborative ML which tackles the challenges of robust ML on sensitive data. It orchestrates
the remote execution of ML models over distributed datasets under advanced privacy constraints.
Substra relies on a private DLT to implement distributed learning in a trustless way. It connects
several users controlling different datasets, to algorithms providers and independent performance
evaluators. In this document, we cover the principles, concepts, usage, architecture, ML orches-
tration features and risk analysis of the proposed technology.
2 Principles
Three core principles drive the development of Substra:
• Collaboration. In practice, data is often spread among several partners and the algorithmic
expertise can belong to yet another institution. Substra is rooted in the belief that state of
the art ML will be built within networks of partners, in particular when the data is sensitive.
• Privacy. Data controllers should never expose their data to obtain a service based on
ML. Sensitive data should remain private and never be transferred to a third party. Favoring
remote execution rather than remote access, Substra is decentralized and makes it impossible
for anyone but the owner or authorized algorithms to access the data.
• Traceability. Complete traceability of all ML operations is essential not only to guarantee
privacy of data, but also to provide an untampered history of the training of any predictive
model. This is necessary to support any reliability claim regarding the performance of a
model.
3 Concepts
Here, we introduce the main concepts underlying Substra. In fact, Substra is a framework to
orchestrate computations in different nodes over several Assets under the constraint of explicit
permission regimes.
3.1 Nodes
Nodes are standalone computing and storage resources running the Substra code. They are organ-
ised into a network. It is assumed that independent partner organizations control their respective
nodes. They form a private network, where every node is connected to all others.
In Substra, users are authenticated through the node they belong to (see section 5 on archi-
tecture). There are only credentials at the institution level: individual users are not personally
identified at the network level. Thus, throughout the document, we will refer to users, organisa-
tions, institution, partners or, nodes indistinctly.
3.2 Assets
Substra registers, stores and organizes computations on four different kinds of Assets: Objectives,
Datasets, Algorithms and, Models. These assets can be private or shared depending on their
permission regime.
• An Objective clearly defines the purpose of the computations. It specifies (i) the data format
that the Dataset, Algorithm and Model must follow, (ii) the identity of the test data points
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Figure 1: The four types of assets in Substra.
used to compare and evaluate the models and, (iii) the metric calculation script which is used
to quantify the accuracy of a model.
• A Dataset aggregates numerous data points under a common standard format. It includes
a single Opener script which imports and opens the file using libraries specific to the data
type.
• An Algorithm is a script which specifies the method to train a Model on a Dataset. In
particular, it specifies the model type and architecture, the loss function, the optimizer,
hyperparameters and, also identifies the parameters that are tuned during training.
• A Model is a potentially large file containing the parameters of a trained model. In the case
of a neural network, a model would contain the weights of the connections. It is the result of
training an Algorithm with a given Dataset. In Substra a Model is defined through a training
task which is specified by a traintuple. The Model can be evaluated via the defintion of a
testtuple.
Substra is agnostic with respect to the Assets nature and format. Substra can be used in any
field for any supervised Machine Learning problem. Consequently, it is up to the users to
design and respect consistent interoperability conventions for their specific application. Openers
and Algorithms have to be manually made compatible for each Objective. The format of each Asset
provided by users must therefore be documented in detail.
3.3 Permission regimes
Each Asset in Substra has its own permission regime. A permission regime specifies which orga-
nizations can process or download a given Asset, as described below.
There are two types of permissions:
• The permission to process an Asset provides the ability to utilize it in a training or prediction
task. If permission to process an Asset is given to a node, then the latter can request the
processing of the Asset. But the Asset never leaves the node of its owner: the processing is
done within the owner node. For instance, a Dataset can be used to train a model by any
organization having the process permission.
• The permission to download an Asset provides the ability to retrieve and access the Asset.
If permission to download an Asset is given to a node, then the Asset will be shared between
this node and the owner node. Of course, the point of Substra is that no Dataset is ever
given a download right (excluding samples of anonymized data points for prototyping).
In Substra, having the download right over an asset implies having the process right.
Beyond the whitelist of organizations having process and/or download rights, an Asset can also
be made available for processing only for specific purposes. To do so the Asset owner must provide
a whitelist of Objectives for which the Asset can be used.
Models that are created by Substra inherit their permission regime from the Assets that were
used during its creation. By default, the process and download whitelists of the new model are
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the intersection of the whitelists of the Dataset, Algorithm and initial Models used for training.
For now, at least one organization must be given the download right so as to be able to store the
Asset. This choice is made explicitly in the traintuple specifying the Model creation.
In Substra, the permission regimes are enforced a priori: a traintuple can only be created if it
respects the permission regime of each Asset involved. In other words, computations can only
be triggered by an organization having at least the process right over all assets referenced in the
traintuple. In fact, the permissions are implemented in trustless smart-contracts which filter the
addition of traintuples in the ledger.
3.4 Computations
At its core, Substra is a tool to orchestrate the execution of training tasks. These training tasks
turn a triplet of Dataset, Algorithm, and Model into an updated Model (see figure 1). The goal
is to fit the model to a new set of data in order to increase performance on similar data points.
The specification of a training task is entirely contained in a Traintuple, which gathers the relevant
information about the necessary Assets and all technical variables to unequivocally describe a
training task.
Traintuples have a counterpart for the test of a Model on a separate Dataset : Testtuples. They
correspond to the specification of evaluation tasks of Models resulting from Traintuples.
One can form a chain of training (and evaluation) tasks, where a model is sequentially updated
with various Datasets and/or Algorithms. We call such chains of tasks Compute Plans. They
can also form more complicated structure with parallelism and pooling steps involved as will be
detailed in section 6.
4 Usage
Here, we describe how Substra can be used. First, the canonical use cases are detailed; second, the
unitary operations allowed are listed; third, the interfaces to interact with Substra are described.
4.1 Use-cases
Three canonical use-cases for Substra are detailed: the data / algorithm collaboration, the data
consortium, and the Training / evaluation collaboration. The first two use cases rely on the fact
that efficient predictive models require lots of data to be trained. Thus, collaborations can be set
up between several actors to increase the amount of data from which a model is trained.
Note that these use cases are compatible. Indeed, all the real world applications of Substra we
are currently aware of borrow from the use-cases below.
4.1.1 Data / algorithm collaboration
When data controllers and model engineers belong to different organizations, effective collaboration
can be a real challenge as data controllers may not be willing to transfer their sensitive data to
potentially untrusted model engineers. Typically, data controllers host large amounts of sensitive
data which can only be processed under strong confidentiality constraints. They have an incentive
to limit the number of copies of their data, and are reluctant to provide access to the data itself.
Model engineers design algorithms which often need large amounts of quality data to be used to
build predictive models. Model engineers are always looking for more data to train their models and
build new and better services. Thus, the collaboration would be beneficial to both but transfering
the data is often to risky for the data controller. In this setup, Substra fosters collaboration by
addressing and removing the need of data transfer.
For instance, in the precise use-case for which Substra was originally designed hospitals are the
data controllers. Through their typical operations they collect countless sensitive and private data.
They want to valorize this data in order to provide better patient-care or to foster medical research.
Yet, they cannot share the data without constraints. In this use-case, model engineers are either
academic researchers or companies specialized in medical AI which want to create and/or sell ML
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based services. These predictive services can be provided directly to the hospitals, or to some third
party.
4.1.2 Data consortium
When competing entities separately collect very similar data, they may be interested in mutually
improving the efficiency of their predictive model provided their data remains private. These
organizations may want to collectiveley train an algorithm across their datasets and share the
resulting aggregate model. Such an approach could improve the efficiency of the entire sector
without favoring one actor over the other.
For instance, Substra can be used between several pharmaceutical companies which have almost
identical processes to discover new drugs and have gathered very similar data over the years.
Crucially, these companies are competitors and want to protect their data from each other. Yet,
using Substra, they can collectively train a common predictive model without revealing their data.
Thus, Substra helps them improve their ability to discover new drugs.
4.1.3 Training / evaluation collaboration
The practice of training predictive models is becoming widespread, but rigorous evaluation of
performance is not always occuring. In most fields, the rise of ML is conditioned by the concrete
proof that the ML models can generalize robustly and can be applied consistently on new data
points. To measure the capacity of a ML model to generalize, a simple but efficient way is to
evaluate it on a representative dataset it has never seen before: this is a test dataset.
Thus independent evaluators could gather representative, well-curated and non-biased datasets
for testing the Models a posteriori. The Evaluators would design an Objective with a test dataset
and open of leaderboard for the predictive models.
For instance in healthcare, one could imagine that regulatory bodies team up with strategic
hospitals to register test cohorts so that all models in Substra can be benchmarked independently.
For a given pathology, there could be test datasets ”certified” by independent organisations to help
evaluate Models. Then startups could design Models which are evaluated on independent data,
leading to increased reproducibility.
4.2 Operations
Substra makes it possible for a user to
• Create an Asset such as a Dataset, Algorithm, or Objective, via direct upload or regsitration
from file.
• Change the permission regime of an Asset.
• Train a Model from available Assets by creating a Traintuple.
• Evaluate the performance of a Model on the test data of an Objective, or using a cross-
validation approach on a Dataset, by creating a Testtuple.
• View and compare the performance of all Models in the form of a leaderboard (i.e. a list of
models ordered by performance).
• Request a prediction from a Model on a new data point.
4.3 Interfaces
In order to perform these operations Substra comes with 3 types of interfaces: a web interface, a
Command Line Interface (CLI), and a Python Software Development Kit (SDK).
• The frontend aims at providing traceability of all operations on Substra Assets. It can also
be used to choose the desired permission regimes on Assets. As shown in figure 2, the Substra
frontend displays lists of all Assets in specific tabs. A search bar can be used to filter Assets.
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Figure 2: Screenshot of the Substra frontend. The Model page of the frontend shown here displays
a leaderboard for a given Objective.
• The CLI makes it possible to add Assets to Substra and also to list registered Assets. Figure
3 shows the commands which can be executed with the CLI. Importantly, each Asset must
be formatted in a proper way before being pushed to the platform.
Figure 3: Screenshot of the CLI help.
• The Python SDK provides the same functionalities as the CLI and offers the flexibility of
a Python environment. As Python is a favored programming language of data scientists, it
makes it easier for them to interact with Substra. In addition, the SDK makes it possible to
integrate Substra in any Python-based application.
5 Architecture
Substra is a distributed software to orchestrate ML computation under tight privacy constraints.
As opposed to the classical client/server architecture, Substra is fundamentally decentralized. It
orchestrates the remote execution of ML tasks across several data centers. By design, the data
never leave their original servers.
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Inherently, Substra provides full traceability and control of data usage. At its core lies a de-
centralized and trustless consensus network which guarantees that all operations are orchestrated
and written in an incorruptible ledger. No party can modify the ledger individually. The platform
exclusively relies on the ledger to dictate its behavior, thus providing strong guarantees of trace-
ability and reproducibility. The ledger in each node is identical. It records the history of all past,
present, and schedulded operations on the network.
The various permission regimes individually governing each asset are also stored in the ledger as
smart contracts. They have a regulating effect on the ledger in that the permission regimes filter
the items added to the ledger. Every operation must meet all the permission constraints before it
is added to the ledger and then subsequently executed by the platform. Since the smart contracts
are self-enforceable, i.e. they do not rely on any third party to be executed, permission constraints
are met by design.
Substra can be viewed as a secure API to run ML computations on third party data. In par-
ticular, it does not include automated design and execution of coherent training strategies over
distributed datasets. Substra simply receives orders from users, checks their permission, and exe-
cutes them.
5.1 Network architecture
Substra is decentralized: it runs on, and connects to, a set of machines in a private network. It
is made of three parts: distributed nodes, a metadata network, and an asset network as shown in
figure 4.
metadata
network
asset
network
Node B
Node C
Node A
Figure 4: Global architecture of a Substra network.
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• The Nodes are mades of four components
– Computing resources can access private data and
common assets in order to perform containerized com-
putations. The computations are engaged only if
specified in the ledger.
– Storage of private data which never leave the node.
This usually corresponds to raw sensitive data (e.g.
medical data) which should remain private at all cost.
The data are secured and used exclusively by the com-
puting resources of the node.
– Storage of common assets such as algorithms or
trained models, which can be shared between nodes
under permission constraints. They are used exclu-
sively by the computing resources of the node.
– A shared and immutable ledger which stores all the
operations on the platform from computing tasks to
data or models registration, and the complete per-
mission settings associated to each Asset. Only non-
sensitive metadata are stored in the ledger, as detailed
in section 5.3. A library of smart contracts, called the
chaincode, is used to read and write to the ledger.
Node
computing
resources
ledger
common assets
(algos & models)
private assets
(raw data)
• An asset network for selectively sharing common assets
– The networks makes it possible to exchange autho-
rized models and algorithms between nodes. More
generally it is a channel to communicate large files
with selected partner nodes.
– Asset download is restricted for use by the node com-
putation unit and by strict permission rules. All
assets have explicit permission regimes which are
checked systematically before manipulating them.
– Private assets, e.g. sensitive raw data, are never
shared on the asset network.
Node B
Node C
Node A
asset
network
• A ledger network for sharing and updating the ledger
– It is powered by a DLT framework: Hyperledger Fab-
ric [5]. The ledger is consensually built and can not be
corrupted. It is operated by the chaincode mentioned
above.
– The ledger of each node is updated frequently and
consistently in order to register new Assets, set
the Asset permissions, and append recent/requested
computation tasks to the task history. As mentioned
above, only non-sensitive metadata transit within this
network.
Node B
Node C
Node A
metadata
network
Figure 5 details the architecture of Substra, and interactions between its different components.
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Peer
Ledger
Chaincode
Peer
Ledger
Chaincode
Peer
Ledger
Chaincode
Node A Node B
Node B userNode A user
substra-backend substrabackend
Figure 5: Overview of the architecture of Substra, illustrated with two nodes. Turquoise arrows
indicate exchanges of non-sensitive metadata between the backend of a node and the
ledger network. The red arrow indicate the exchange of an algorithm or model through
the asset network.
5.2 Workflow
The workflow describes the typical sequence of steps that are performed by the platform in order
to address user requests properly. It is out of the scope of this document to detail all of them, only
the general and principal patterns are presented here.
5.2.1 Orchestration by the ledger of computations
The workflow of a Substra network is driven by two coupled and asynchronous circuits: ledger and
computation operations.
• Ledger operations are performed through the DLT framework and are triggered by user
inputs. They mainly consist in registering assets and specifying (possibly a sequence of)
computations to be performed independently.
• Computation operations are automated and performed locally in the node with private and
common assets. Computations are only triggered and authorized when defined in the ledger.
Computation results are logged in the ledger.
Thus, if a node is randomly removed from the network then the other nodes can continue operating
normally, except that they lose their ability to process the private data of the leaving node.
5.2.2 Example of workflow
To help understand the detailed workflow, a simplistic yet representative example between two
nodes is detailed below. This corresponds to user A (owner of node A) being a data controller (e.g.
a hospital) and user B (owner of node B) being an algorithm developer (e.g. an AI company).
Both parties explicitly agree through the permission settings that user B can train her algorithms
on user A’s private data. Figure 6 illustrates the successive steps in the processing of user’s B
request.
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1 2
5
6
3
4 7
Figure 6: Substra’s workflow between two example nodes. See description of steps in text.
1. User of node A registers private data to the platform. Associated non-sensitive metadata
are submitted to the ledger (see details in section 5.3). The ledger update is automatically
broadcasted and accepted by the other node.
2. User of node B registers a common/shared algorithm to the platform. Associated non-
sensitive metadata are submitted to the ledger. The ledger update is automatically broad-
casted and accepted by the other node.
3. User of node B requests a computation of his algorithm on user A’s private data. A new
computation task is specified in the ledger. It is then broadcasted and accepted by the other
node only if it meets the permission settings of node A’s private data, which are found in the
ledger.
4. Node A observes that there is a new task to be processed in the ledger and automatically
downloads the common algorithm from node B (which authenticates node A against the
ledger) and stores it.
5. Node A securely performs the computation and applies user B’s algorithm on its own private
data.
6. Non sensitive metadata summarizing the computation execution and resulting performance
are written by Node A in the ledger which synchronizes with other nodes immediately.
7. (Optional) Outputs of the computations, such as trained models (but never private data),
can be sent back to node B depending on chosen permissions.
This simple workflow can be chained and composed to perform arbitrarily complicated computa-
tions at the scale of the network, as detailed in section 6.
The ledger gathers all user inputs and the computation units listen to ledger updates in order
to trigger and perform computations on their private data.
5.3 Information stored in the ledger
As mentioned previously, the ledger stores only non-sensitive metadata, required for the orches-
tration and for the traceability of the training of machine learning models on distributed data.
Table 5.3 summarizes elements stored in the ledger.
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Object Attributes stored in the ledger
Objective - Name of the Objective
- Storage address and hash of its description
- Name, storage address and hash of its metrics
- Owner (node who defined the objective)
- Test datasets (list of data keys for the test split, and their associated dataset)
- Permissions
Dataset - Name of the Dataset
- Storage address and hash of its data opener type of data in the dataset
(tabular, image, ...)
- Storage address and hash of its description file
- Owner
- Associated Objective key
- Permissions
Data - Hash of data stored in local storage
- List of keys of associated Datasets
- A boolean indicating if data is dedicated to testing
Algorithm - Name of the Algorithm
- Storage address and hash of the algorithm files
- Owner
- Associated Objective key
- Storage address and hash of the description of the algorithm
- Permissions
Traintuple - Associated Objective key (for its metrics)
- Associated Algorithm key
- List of input models (list of traintuple keys, hashes, addresses)
- Output Model (hash, address)
- List of training data and the node where they are stored
- Status of the task: waiting, todo, doing, done, failed
- Log
- Optional arguments necessary for complex ML orchestration (a rank and a
tag)
- Permissions
- Creator (node who defined the traintuple)
Testtuple - Associated Objective key (for the metrics)
- Associated Algorithm key
- Model to evaluate (hash, address)
- List of testing data and the node where they are stored
- Status of the task: waiting, todo, done, failed
- Log
- Optional arguments necessary for complex ML orchestration (e.g. a tag re-
grouping several ML tasks)
- Permissions
- Creator (node who defined the testtuple)
6 ML orchestration
To launch Substra on large amounts of distributed data, users must create sequences of tasks
which are executed by Substra. These are called compute plans. They prescribe unambiguously
the organization and ordering of computations for training algorithms on datasets. They also make
it possible to evaluate a model against several test datasets. Substra does not involve automated
generation of Compute plans. It simply executes the user’s orders in the form of Compute plans.
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6.1 Chaining training and averaging
The first building block of compute plans is the training step, specified by a traintuple. It defines
a unitary training task which updates a Model as the result of the training of an Algorithm on a
given Dataset. In the classical setup traintuples take a single model as input and provide another
model as output.
The second building block of compute plans is the averaging step. It takes several Models
as inputs and outputs a single ”averaged” Model, either by averaging the prediction of the input
models [15], or by averaging the weights of the inputs models [22]. Depending on the type of model
used and the particular FL strategy, more complex operations might be needed.
A compute plan is a set of training and averaging steps, whose in and out models are chained
in a specific and possibly complicated pattern. Basically, chaining can be done in a sequential or
parallel way as illustrated in figure 7.
Sequential compute plans only use training steps; there is no averaging involved. In the simplest
case, the Algorithm is fixed and a Model is successively trained on multiple remote Datasets. Note
that changing the order of the datasets is likely to change the end model.
Parallel compute plans correspond to a sucession of training and averaging steps. First, several
models are trained from the same initial model using different training datasets. Second, the
models are aggregated in a single output model.
Training step
on data A
A
Aggregation step
Sequential
model
end
model
start
A B C
Parallel
model
end
model
start
A
B
C
Figure 7: (left) Elements of compute plans (see text for details). (right) Basic compute plan sam-
ples: (i) sequential training consists in a sequence of training on different datasets, (ii)
parallel learning is made by training several models independently but with the same
initial model, then an aggregating step merge the several models in a single output.
These two basic patterns can be chained and composed to create arbitrarily complex compute
plans as illustrated in figure 8. The first compute plan shown in figure 8 corresponds to the standard
pattern in federated learning [22].
6.2 Evaluation
Evaluation is an important part of Substra. It is split in validation datasets for hyper-parameter
tuning and test datasets for evaluation on new data.
• Validation is made flexible and entirely parametrable by users who can perform any kind
of cross validation scheme on any subpart of the train datasets.
• Test datasets however are sanctuarized and can never be used for training. Test performance
evaluation is constrained to a rigorous methodology.
Each node in the network may define a subpart of its data as an immutable test dataset. The
evaluation against these datasets is defined in the form of an Objective and can be requested by
any user with the appropriate processing rights. Figure 9 illustrates a typical evaluation pattern
of the performance of a model before and after training. Notably, the evaluation in Substra can
be done on each user dataset. Thus, there may be different performance levels of a single model
depending on the node/user evaluating it.
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model
start
model
end
D
A
B
C
A
E
F
D
E
F
E
F
D
F
D
E
model
start
model
end
A
B
C
A
B
C
A
B
C
A
B
C
A
B
C
A B A C
Figure 8: Sample compute plans. (top) Standard compute plan with regular succession of parralel
and averaging steps. (bottom) Excessively complicated sample compute plan to illustrate
the compostion of basic patterns.
A'
evaluation on
test dataset A'
model
start
model
end
A'A'
A
B
C
A
B
C
Figure 9: Sample compute plan involving evaluation steps. Here the owner of data A and A’ is
training an algorithm on other remote datasets. Although it involves other data, the
evaluation is only made on A’.
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Cross-validation is a standard methodology for evaluating model performance. For a k-fold
cross-validation, k pairs of training and test datasets are derived from the original dataset, and
the performance is computed as the average of the performance on the k test datasets. In Substra
cross-validation is formalized as a specific Objective with a training dataset, but without test
dataset.
6.3 Model composition
Large ML models, in particular deep learning models, are often the composition of several sub
models which can be trained independently. Substra supports models defined as combinations of
others. Of course, the complexity of the resulting algorithm has to be handled by the user; but
Substra has been specifically designed to make it easy to handle training tasks over combined
models.
Transfer learning on neural networks often implies modifying an existing network by adding
or removing some layers and fine tuning some connections in the network. For instance, when
considering a task of classification over images, it is common to download the weights of a pre-
trained neural network designed for discriminating other classes (such as ResNet [19]) and recycle
the lower layers of the deep network as shown in figure 10. This corresponds to what is called a
warm start. It makes it possible to reuse the weights trained for a certain Objective for another
one. This is the canonical example of sequential orchestration with model composition. In fact,
figure 10 corresponds to a simple sequential compute plan.
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private
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...
...
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...
...
Random
initialization
of weights
Initialization of
low layers weights
with pre-trained
network
Pre-trained
network
Training on
Dataset A
Low layers
weights
extraction
Training on
Dataset B
Fine-tuned
network
Objective A Objective B
...
...
...
...
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...
Figure 10: Classical multi-task learning approach called warm restart. First, a neural network
is trained on Dataset A and evaluated against Objective A. The initialization of the
weights is usually random. In order to transfer the knowledge from the pre-trained
Model to another task, one can extract its lower layers and consider them as the initial
weights of a second network built for Objective B, which is to be fine-tuned on Dataset
B. In this case the inputs are considered the same across Objectives.
This means several users can decide to share exclusively the lower layers of a network. This
would correspond to changing the process permission of the sub-network. This common subpart
of the Model is called a Trunk. Each node keeps the upper layers of its Model private. They
constitute the private Heads. Figure 10 illustrates a situation where two partners want to train
together a common trunk model, but do not want to share their data and not even the definition
of their own Objective. It is a situation with increased privacy where partners do not know what
the other is computing. Nonetheless, in using the backpropagation training algorithm not only
through head layers, but also through trunk layers for each partner, the trunk model can benefit
from the information of all partners without revealing private information.
Substra is also designed to tackle parallel orchestration combined with model composition. A
standard compute plan associated with such a combined model is illustrated in figure 11.
Note that a quasi identical approach can be applied for domain adaptation [24], which corre-
sponds to multiple users having an identical goal (and thus a single Objective), but with data from
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Figure 11: Federated multitask learning. The trunk model is trained collectively but the private
head models are never shared between partners.
different sources and with slightly different format or distribution. In this case, the modularity of
the network occurs at the lower layers of the neural network.
7 Risk analysis
This section proposes a high-level risk analysis focused on the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Avail-
ability [1] of the different Assets of Substra. An exhaustive risk analysis is out of the scope of this
whitepaper, and we focus on the risks which we have estimated as the most relevant. In particular,
we focus on the risks due to an attacker being part of the network, i.e. the attacker is assumed to
control entirely its own node and is willing to attack the Assets of others. For simplicity, we do
not address the risks due to attackers from within the node or from outside the network. These
kinds of attacks are relevant and should be mitigated, but are not specific to Substra, thus they
are not addressed here.
An important feature of Substra is trustless traceability. Any risk is at least partly mitigated
by transparency mechanisms. It is not possible to launch operations which are not stored in the
ledger with Substra. Thus, any attack triggering specific computations will be recorded in the
ledger for possible future inspection.
7.1 Confidentiality
Substra is deliberately developed to provide high confidentiality of Datasets. In many situations
confidentiality is synonymous to privacy, which is terminology specific to personal data. At the core
of Substra design is the principle of never moving Datasets between nodes. Only the Algorithms and
Models are exchanged between nodes. Thus, compared to a classical centralized architecture, using
Substra decreases the confidentiality risk on Datasets at the expense of an increased confidentiality
risk on Algorithms and Models. Substra implies transfer of risk from Dataset to Algorithms and
Models.
The confidentiality attacks can be organized in 3 groups: Dataset theft, Algorithm / Model theft
and metadata leak. They are identified in the table below:
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Risk Risk description Built-in Substra mitigation Additional mitigations
needed
Data theft
Attacker downloads
raw data.
Data remain within each node in-
frastructure.
Attacker designs
malevolent Algo-
rithm to extract
data (possibly in
the Model weights).
Model ’s permission regime can
forbid model download.
Securing the compute worker
(e.g. no access to network dur-
ing computations).
Algorithm certification by
third party.
Data in-
ference
Attacker infer
properties about
the data from the
trained models.
Model access can be restricted. Certification for designing
non-identifying models.
Contractualisation be-
tween partners.
Algorithm
/ Model
theft
Attacker steals the
algorithm or model
during a training
step.
Securing the compute worker
(e.g. model never stored on hard
drive).
Permission regime selects who
can process model.
Trusted Execution Envi-
ronments (TEE).
Contractualisation be-
tween partners.
Metadata
leak
The common ledger
containing the plat-
form metadata is
leaked outside the
network.
Metadata are anonymous, the
ledger only contains hashes of as-
sets.
Overall, the risk of a Dataset confidentiality breach is largely mitigated by the Substra computa-
tion architecture. The main residual risk lies in malevolent Algorithms which could leak Datasets
out of the node, for instance, in writing the data themselves in the model weights. It can be
strongly mitigated by requiring the Models permission regimes to exclude download access to the
corresponding Algorithm designer. Independent audit and certification of the Algorithm before
deployment could be a pragmatic alternative. A more limited residual risk consists in infering
properties about the individual data from the trained model itself. This is actually unlikely if the
training procedure is well designed and the model diffusion limited.
The residual risk on Algorithms and Models confidentiality is not negligible. On its own, Substra
can only make it difficult for a node to steal a Model which is being trained locally. Since the
program runs on the machine of the user it cannot be theoretically bulletproof. A future idea for
a solution would be to rely on the growth of Trusted Execution Environments [26, 21], but the
lack of required GPU support for current TEE make this possibility speculative. In practice, it is
necessary to consider contractual interactions between the network partners to cover the residual
risk on Algorithms and Models. Today, Substra is not likely to be deployed in an open network
where everyone could participate as in a public blockchain.
Confidentiality of Datasets goes beyond the simple access to the raw data; privacy of individuals
who are part of the Dataset is to be guaranteed. The design of Substra was strongly influenced
by the GDPR and takes the question of privacy as a first principle. More precisely, an important
risk to address is the leaking of high level personal information without accessing the Datasets
themselves.
There are several guidelines or good practices that we strongly recommend to adopt when de-
ploying Substra over personal data. Their details are out of the scope of the whitepaper.
• Always pseudonymize data before registering them as Datasets in Substra. Anonymization
procedures [8] are even better, but not always relevant for certain use cases (e.g. Healthcare
where re-identifying patients is key to provide personalized care).
• Design non-identifying Models, so that they can be exchanged without exposing personal
information. Models are statistical objects which do not need to contain identifying infor-
mation. Actually, it is often the case that models that leak information about individual
data points are ill-designed for this setting; for instance in the classical problem of overfitting
([29]). Requiring training Algorithms to be properly regularized is paramount. Similarly, an
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efficient mitigation consists in restricting training steps to be performed on large groups of
individuals so as to dilute the personal information in the aggregate. Trusted audits and
certification of Algorithms are necessary for the use cases requiring the highest degree of
privacy.
In other words, Substra does not solve the problem of privacy on its own; a number of privacy-
enhancing protocols must be enforced to guarantee the highest level of privacy.
7.2 Integrity
Substra provides high integrity guarantees, mainly because of its architecture rooted in an un-
falsifiable distributed ledger logging all ML operations. All Assets are registered and referenced
through a unique identifier. The identifier is in fact the hash of the Asset, which makes it possi-
ble to guarantee the Assets have not changed when reproducing a sequential training procedure.
Integrity of Assets can therefore be checked at all times.
Integrity applies also on the results, i.e. predictions on new data. It is crucial to make sure
that the predictions cannot be biased by an attacker. Beyond standard attacks on a node which
are not covered here, there is a particular kind of attack fundamentally linked to the specifics of
Substra: participating in a collaborative training (with Datasets or Algorithms) in order to bias
the prediction of the output Model. A possible mitigation of this risk is to test the predictive
performance on specific test Objectives equipped with controlled and independent test Datasets. It
is indeed likely that methods devoted to bias prediction lead to poorer performance on test datasets.
There is a clear security incentive to consider and favor the best Model for each Objective. However,
a residual risk lies in the fact that large predictive models could contain stolen data while keeping
good performance.
Risk Risk description Built-in Substra mitigation Additional mitigations
needed
Results
integrity
Attacker changes
the performance
metadata.
DLT prevents from changing re-
ports made by others.
Results
and
Assets
integrity
Attacker modifies a
model to alter pre-
diction quality (for
instance by training
on biased datasets).
Full traceability of operations
and storing of intermediate mod-
els to be able to revert a bad
training step.
Independent test sets to
validate performance evo-
lution
7.3 Availability
Availability attacks are not critical to Substra functioning. Being a distributed, asynchronous
network, Substra has a low-latency. This is not a significant problem since Substra is focused on
training Models which does not involve immediate user interaction. It is also resilient to attacks on
single nodes due to its decentralized architecture: an availability attack on a partner only blocks
the Assets exclusively owned by this partner.
To decrease the risk of overloading a node, the ledger or the network with too many training or
prediction tasks, permission regimes can be set up to create a white list of users which can request
computations. The permissions are applied a priori to prevent illegitimate training tasks to be
added in the ledger and synchronized over the network.
Risk Risk description Built-in Substra mitigation Additional mitigations
needed
Service
availabil-
ity
Attacker overloads
a node with train-
ing or prediction re-
quests.
Other nodes still function.
Permission regime authorizes
only specific nodes to launch
computations on one’s node.
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8 Perspectives
Substra’s ambition is to become the standard framework for performing collaborative ML over
distributed datasets. It is designed to be modular and open. There are countless ways to improve
the framework or integrate it into existing software solutions.
Integration with similar projects
There are several technologies similar to Substra which are emerging today; we believe the future
of Substra is conditioned by its ability to interface nicely with other software in particular in the
open source community. Collaborative initiatives between projects are likely to drive the rise of a
”responsible and trustworthy data science” ecosystem that we pledge for.
To name only a few similar projects:
• OpenMined [4] is building PyTorch libraries for privacy-preserving deep learning with deep
training content [10].
• Dropout Labs [2] is building TensorFlow libraries for ML on encrypted data.
• Google is designing a library/SDK for TensorFlow to add federated learning features for
smart phones [9].
• Ocean Protocol [7] and Oasis Labs [6] are building decentralized networks enabling the de-
velopment of privacy-preserving data-based applications.
Secure aggregation of model updates
In parallel compute plans, there is a central aggregator which takes many model updates from
different nodes as inputs and outputs a single averaged model. This is a typical pattern in Federated
Learning [22]. It is associated with a significant risk at the central point since the aggregator has
access to all model updates from the nodes, from which it could infer sensitive information about
the nodes’ data. A classical approach to mitigate this risk is to use a mechanism of secure aggretion
where the model updates are individually obfuscated by the aggregator can still output an accurate
average [13]. This is an interesting perspective for Substra for some use-cases.
Non assignability of metadata
Substra could benefit from strong anonymity features regarding who owns which Asset. For now,
assigning the ownership of an Asset to a node is accessible to competent and technical attack-
ers. However, the DLT-based architecture of Substra gives us reason to assume that providing
anonymity is technically possible. Substra is still a consortium based technology; thus it will only
provide anonymity among the members of an explicit consortium. But ”hiding among the trees”
can be relevant to numerous use cases.
Ownerless Assets
Substra could open the possibility of having ownerless Assets. By combining a Multi Party Com-
putation approach (such as Shamir secret sharing) with the ledger of Substra, one could imagine
encrypting some Assets and split the decryption key among nodes. Later when a traintuple involves
this Asset, a node could gather all the key parts from other nodes to decypher the Asset which
could be erased from this node after computation. This feature could open brand new use cases
where extra privacy or decentralized control of Assets is required. This raises difficult technical
and security challenges, for instance, to keep the availibility of service sufficiently high for practical
applications.
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Non-identifying Models
As shown in the risk analysis in section 7, the usage of Substra needs to be considered together with
the definition and adoption of sound guidelines for Algorithm design in order to reach the highest
level of privacy preservation. The guidelines should guarantee that Models are non-identifying.
This means that the precise information about data samples in the train Datasets cannot be
retrieved from a Model. For instance, these guidelines will surely address the problem of overfitting
for Model design. This problem is not only bad for generalization of Models, but it also leaks much
more information about the overfitted Dataset. Importantly, these guidelines will have to be
promoted and checked by trustful regulatory entities.
Partner ecosystem
On an ecosystemic aspect, the growth of Substra into a widespread, production-grade network is
likely to involve different roles among the partners within a Substra network. Inevitably, the growth
of Substra will be bounded by the capacity of the current actors of our socio-economic ecosystem
to structure themselves to use the technology to their specific advantage. A first category of actors
gathers Asset controllers. Some of them will specialize in Datasets collections and management
(e.g. Hospitals), whereas some others will specialize in Algorithm creation and management (e.g.
AI startups). Both types of actors will inevitably have to deal with Model management and
permission setting. A second category of actors gathers regulators and evaluators of the Models
performance. They will deal with the design and management of Objectives and in particular the
associated test Datasets. Note that it is crucial to have independent actors providing standardized
benchmarks of Models.
Token-based economic ecosystem
Finally, an interesting perspective would be to leverage the built-in traceability within Substra in
order to create a token-based economic system for collaborative Machine Learning. This would
involve attributing a value to the Substra Asset which could be aligned with the performance
improvement brought by each Asset on predefined Objectives. For instance, one could compute a
contribution score for each Datasets by evaluating the percentage of improvement observed after
training on it. Although it is beyond the scope of the current version of Substra, this economic
system could be a real driver for the growth of Substra and collaborative, privacy-preserving
Machine Learning.
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